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Abstract 
The paper aims to review the criterion of “sensitive data” under Art. 8 of the Data Protection Directive 95/46/EC 
(DPD) in the online environment. Sensitive data is defined under Art. 8 as ‘personal data revealing racial origin, 
political opinions or religious or philosophical beliefs, trade union membership, and the processing of data 
concerning health or sex life.’ Following the Lindqvist case (C-101-01), it is questionable how the criterion 
applies in practice. More specifically, it can be contended that any images/photographs of the data subject 
uploaded on the internet falls within Art. 8 of the DPD because the image/picture reveals some of the 
characteristics that may be regarded as sensitive data.  The paper also takes account of Professor Simitis’s report 
entitled Revisiting sensitive data published in 1999, which examined whether "sensitivity" really was a valid 
criterion for determining the conditions of the processing in the context of the Council of Europe Convention on 
Personal Data. In this review, the paper calls for a change in how sensitive data is assessed. It considers the 
purpose-based and contextualised approach to sensitive personal data in the online environment. 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
 
The paper examines the concept of “sensitive data” as defined under the Data Protection Directive 95/46/EC 
(DPD) (hereinafter termed “DPD”) and considers whether the categorisation of sensitive data should be amended 
in the light of technological developments.  Under Art. 8(1) of the DPD, sensitive data is defined as ‘personal 
data revealing racial origin, political opinions or religious or philosophical beliefs, trade union membership, and 
the processing of data concerning health or sex life.’ 
However, when Art. 8(1) of the DPD is applied on the internet, it is questionable whether the criterion 
works in practice. More specifically, the case of Lindqvist (C-101/01)1 demonstrates the problem of publishing 
personal information containing sensitive data on the World Wide Web. In this case, L had uploaded a web page 
containing details about members of a Parish Church. The website also included information about a member 
who had injured her foot. When the case was referred to the European Court of Justice (ECJ) for a preliminary 
ruling, the issue was whether the publication of a member who had injured her foot constituted the processing of 
“sensitive data” because this was data concerning the health of an individual. Leaving aside the exemptions under 
Art. 8(2) of the DPD, my main concern is the broad application of Art. 8 DPD to anything published on the web 
page, which directly or indirectly refers to anyone having a political opinion, religious or philosophical beliefs, 
trade union member or data concerning the health or sex life. Another area of because the processing of personal 
data revealing racial origin?  To put it another way, if I had published a picture of an Eskimo, would I be 
processing sensitive data because the picture reveals the Eskimo’s racial origin?  Under the DPD, Art. 8(1) would 
apply irrespective of how trivial the case may be. 
These are questions that are not easy to answer, but the paper will firstly consider the origins of sensitive 
data. This will be followed by the current approach adopted under the DPD and the Lindqvist2 case. I will then 
look at Professor Simitis’s report  (1999) entitled Revisiting sensitive data and consider the arguments in the light 
of the online environment. By online environment, I am excluding manual files containing personal data such as 
card indexes.  I am referring specifically to the internet and the World Wide Web. 
 
 
                                                          
∗ A version of this paper was published in   Complex 4/06 - Sylvia M. Kierkegaard (ed.): Legal, privacy and security 
issues in information technology 
1 2004] 1 C.M.L.R. 20 
2 Ibid. 
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2.    ORIGINS OF SENSITIVE DATA  
 
Sensitive data was originally introduced under the Council of Europe Convention 1981 on Personal Data 
(hereinafter termed “CoE Convention”). Art. 6 of the CoE3 Convention provides that  
Personal data revealing racial origin, political opinions or religious or other beliefs, as well 
as personal data concerning health or sexual life, may not be processed automatically unless 
domestic law provides appropriate safeguards. The same shall apply to personal data 
relating to criminal convictions. 
 
The CoE 1981 and the OECD Guidelines on Personal Data 1980 (the latter is not discussed here) have 
been influential in the developments leading up to the DPD. Furthermore, these international instruments have 
been a model to some countries enacting data protection laws (Bygrave, 2003). 
According to Simitis (1999), the categorisation was readily accepted without question within the DPD.  
Although member states of the European Economic Area have implemented the DPD including Art. 8(1)4 on 
sensitive data, the question that has arisen is whether the categorisation falls short of the dangers highlighted in 
recent technological developments? To give an example, the Council of Europe report (entitled Informational 
self-determination in the internet era) recommended that identification numbers that enable many databases or 
data to be connected together should be included within the definition of “sensitive data”. This practice has 
become widespread in the public and private sector. The DPD however, leaves it to the discretion of the member 
state to determine the conditions under which a national identification number or any other identifier of general 
application may be processed (Art. 8(7) DPD), but does not specifically touch on the subject of identification 
numbers in the online environment or its use in databases.   
Secondly, the category should also cover “profiling”. This is defined in Swiss law as ‘a combination of 
data that enable an aspect of the key aspects of the personality of an individual to be made.’ (CoE Report, 2005). 
The report suggested that anonymous profiling should be included when this is used to take subsequent decisions 
concerning persons covered under this profile.  It is interesting to note from the report that the current definition 
of sensitive data is too wide and we should abandon the approach based on the definition of the actual nature of 
data in favour of a purpose-based approach. To put it another way, what is the purpose of such processing? Is the 
processing intended to reveal sensitive data such as political opinions? This alternative would not only be 
pragmatic, but also resolve the difficulties highlighted in Lindqvist,5 where any personal information published 
on the web could theoretically fall within Art. 8(1) involving the processing of sensitive data. This is a slightly 
different from the contextualised approach that I will be exploring later. What I mean by contextualised approach 
is that personal data becomes sensitive according to its context as argued by Simitis (1999).  Before examining 
both approaches, I want to examine the case of Lindqvist6 in the next section looking at the implications of the 
European Court of Justice’s decision. 
 
 
3.     THE IMPLICATIONS OF LINDQVIST  
 
I have already discussed the facts of the Lindqvist case above and do not want to reiterate this here, so I 
want to consider the main issues under this case. The European Court of Justice (hereinafter “ECJ”) 
had to decide:  
Whether the act of referring, on an internet page, to various persons and identifying them by 
name or by other means, for instance by giving their telephone number or information regarding their 
working conditions and hobbies, constitutes the processing of personal data wholly or partly by 
automatic means within the meaning of Article 3(1) of Directive 95/46? 
                                                          
3  http://conventions.coe.int/treaty/en/Treaties/Html/108.htm, Last retrieved 20 February 2006. 
4  See PRIVIREAL. Data protection: countries (http://www.privireal.org/content/dp/countries.php), Retrieved February 2006. 
5  See n. 1. 
6  Ibid. 
Journal of International  Commercial Law and Technology                Vol. 2, Issue 1(2007)  
 11                        
If the answer to the first question is in the affirmative, was the processing of personal data such 
as that described in the first question covered by one of the exceptions in Article 3(2) of Directive 
95/46? 
Whether reference to the fact that an individual had injured her foot and is on half-time on 
medical grounds constitutes personal data concerning health within the meaning of Article 8(1) of 
Directive 95/46? 
Finally, the question is whether any transfer [of data] to a third country within the meaning of 
Article 25 of Directive 95/46 where an individual in a Member State loads personal data onto an 
internet page which is stored on an internet site on which the page can be consulted and which is 
hosted by a natural or legal person (the hosting provider) who is established in that State or in another 
Member State, thereby making those data accessible to anyone who connects to the internet, including 
people in a third country? The referring court also asks whether the reply to that question would be the 
same if no one from the third country had in fact accessed the data or if the server where the page was 
stored was physically in a third country. 
For the purpose of this paper, the relevant issue is the ECJ’s decision to question three. In reply 
to the third question, the ECJ held that in the light of the purpose of the Data Protection Directive 
95/46/EC, the expression “data concerning health” used in Article 8(1) thereof must be given a wide 
interpretation so as to include information concerning all aspects, both physical and mental, of the 
health of an individual (emphasis added). Therefore, reference to the fact that an individual has injured 
her foot and is on half-time on medical grounds constituted personal data concerning health within the 
meaning of Article 8(1) of Directive 95/46. 
The court’s wide interpretation of Art. 8(1) should come as no surprise for academics and 
practitioners engaged in this area of work. However, I was slightly puzzled and even amazed that the 
decision should come as a shock or even disbelief by some individuals including Lindqvist herself for 
the court’s wide approach.  My main objection was not the court’s wide approach to the interpretation 
of Art. 8(1). Otherwise, it would, in my view, defeat the very objectives laid down under Art. 1(1) of 
the DPD. Art. 1(1) protects the fundamental rights and freedoms of individuals including privacy. 
Rather, my concern was grounded by the fact that the original legislators (to the DPD) felt it necessary 
to have a category on sensitive data, meriting further protection.  Why give preference to this particular 
category?  
The publication of personal information on the web (whether by individuals or organisations) 
also underlines certain dilemmas for data protection authorities that oversee and enforce the data 
protection laws within their own member state.   
Should the data protection authorities adopt a literal approach to their own data protection laws 
by requiring that individuals obtain consent before he/she publishes personal data on the web? Or 
should the data protection authorities adopt a flexible or teleological stance so that individuals (whether 
jointly or not) who intentionally publish personal data on the World Wide Web with the aim of 
psychologically harming others are prosecuted? Some authorities such as the CNIL (French data 
protection authority) have published guidelines about the publication of health information on the 
internet. These guidelines do not apply in all the member state countries and therefore, divergences 
between these countries still remain. An added impediment is the prosecution of individuals by data 
protection authorities outside the EEA who publish personal data on the web. I am referring to 
countries that do not have data protection laws. How do data protection authorities enforce their laws 
outside their own country? (Korff, 2001).  Art. 28 of the DPD expressly refers to the role of the 
supervisory authority and the working party on the protection of individuals with regard to the 
processing of personal data.  The relevant provisions are Art. 28(1) and (6) of the DPD.   Art. 28(1) 
states that: 
Each Member State shall provide that one or more public authorities are responsible for 
monitoring the application within its territory of the provisions adopted by the Member States 
pursuant to this Directive. 
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Art. 28(6) further provides that: 
 
Each supervisory authority is competent, whatever the national law applicable to the 
processing in question, to exercise, on the territory of its own Member State, the processing in 
question, to exercise, on the territory of its own Member State, the powers conferred on it in 
accordance with paragraph 3. Each authority may be requested to exercise its powers by an 
authority of another Member State.  
The supervisory authorities shall cooperate with one another to the extent necessary for 
the performance of their duties, in particular by exchanging all useful information 
(emphasis added). 
 
Although these provisions give the added assurance of co-operation between supervisory 
authorities of Member States, it is not entirely clear how third countries (outside the EEA) as defined 
under Art. 25 and 26 applies. In other words, if an individual from a “third country” misuses personal 
information of an individual in an EEA state, it is questionable whether the individual can seek redress 
from the offender without the co-operation of the supervisory authority in the third country (assuming 
that the third country has a data protection authority).  The picture is not completely negative because 
some countries such as Switzerland and Hungary have enacted data protection laws (that are modelled 
on the DPD) and the Commission has ruled that their laws have satisfied the “adequacy” requirements 
under Art. 25. Countries such as India and China, however, still fall short of the necessary requirements 
of “adequacy” (Privacy Exchange, 2006 and Privacy International, 2004 respectively). The issues that I 
refer to above are only the tip of the iceberg. Enforcement is not a topic I have dealt with in any great 
detail. It, however, serves to highlight the global nature of the internet/world wide web and the naive 
attitude adopted by original legislators to the DPD that enforcement can be taken at a national level 
without the willing co-operation of authorities from countries outside the EEA (including the US). 
          In the next section, I want to consider the different approaches to sensitive data and decide why 
the current categorisation (under Art. 8 DPD) based on the definition of the actual nature of data 
appears impractical and arguably antiquated with the general processing of personal data on the 
internet. 
 
4. So which approach is it?  A purpose-based or a contextualised approach?  
 
4.1     Purpose-based approach 
 
I should state from the outset that it was the Council of Europe Report into informational determination 
(2005) that originally put forward the concept of a purpose-based approach. I raise this subject because 
it is markedly different from the contextualised approach (considered below). In this section, I want to 
explore the main arguments to a purpose-based approach. As discussed earlier, a purpose-based 
approach looks at the purpose underlying the processing of personal data. Is the processing intended to 
reveal sensitive data?  The approach has the advantage of targeting perpetrators or would be offenders 
who intentionally reveal data of a sensitive nature (as defined under Art. 8(1) and does not adopt a 
blanket approach to the application of Art. 8(1) DPD. Namely, that all personal data involving political 
opinions, religious beliefs of individuals (and so forth) would fall under Art. 8(1). Such an approach 
also (in my view) reduces the number of trivial cases (the principle of de minimis non curat lex) being 
brought before the court. In my view, it is also arguable that the administrative burdens placed upon 
data protection authorities would be lessened if this approach were adopted. In short, the main 
advantages are: 
 
• Cost effectiveness – reducing the administrative burdens of data protection authorities. 
• Teleological/purposive approach -  directing Art. 8(1) DPD to the root of the problem. 
• Observing the de minimis principle - the court should not be concerned with trivial cases. 
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• The question that remains to be answered is who decides whether the data in question is 
sensitive?  Should one adopt an objective approach, so that a reasonable man in the 
shoes of the data subject would consider that the publication of personal data on the 
internet was sensitive and intended to harm him or her?  
• If the purpose-based approach is to be considered seriously then the questions that I raise 
should be fully addressed so that there are no uncertainties (or at least minimised). 
 
4.2      Contextualised-approach 
 
A contextualised approach to sensitive data means that personal data becomes sensitive according to its context 
(Simitis, 1999).  This was the approach adopted by Germany (Simitis, 1999). The German data protection laws 
(Federal Data Protection Act 2001 and Länder data protection laws) have, however, implemented the DPD to 
include the category of sensitive data. However, a contextualised approach takes an inclusive stance by refusing 
to adopt the current line of  thinking under the DPD that certain categories such as religious beliefs, political 
opinions merit further protection.  This is not to say that the processing of personal data revealing religious 
beliefs should not be regarded as the processing of sensitive data, but rather data may, under certain 
contexts/circumstances be treated as the processing of sensitive data. 
In this section I want to consider the main arguments discussed by Simitis in his report back in 1999. The report 
arose from a review of the answers to the questionnaire of the Consultative Committee of the Convention for the 
Protection of Individuals with regard to the Automatic Processing of Personal Data.  It is interesting to note that 
differences existed in the interpretation of sensitive data between member state countries to the European Union 
before the DPD was implemented.  
Countries, like Austria and Germany, that had consistently rejected all abstract categorisations of personal 
data and instead focussed on a context-orientated appreciation of the data, must consequently abandon their 
long-standing practice and for the first-time expressly recognise the existence of sensitive data (emphasis added). 
The enumeration of sensitive data under Art. 8(1) (be it personal data revealing political opinions, 
religious beliefs and so forth), however leaves open the question about whether this list is exhaustive. Indeed, 
Simitis (1999) considered at the time that no specific category existed for genetic data within Art. 8(1).  However, 
according to Recommendation R (97) 5 on the Protection of Medical Data, genetic data has been subsumed in the 
health or medical data (Simitis, 1999). Austria, Iceland, Norway, Portugal and Switzerland have also taken the 
view that genetic data fell within health or medical data under Art. 8(1) (Simitis, 1999).  The issue of genetic data 
raises the debate about how extensive should the list for sensitive data be? More specifically, Art. 8(1) DPD is 
silent on “profiling” (Bygrave, 2002) and whether this type of activity justifies extensive protection because of 
the sensitive nature involved (whether it reveals political opinions, religious beliefs, health, trade union 
membership etc. is another matter) and the consequences arising from its misuse. It should be noted that 
“profiling” could be regarded as a “processing” activity within Art. 2(b) DPD. Art. 2(b) states that  
‘Processing of personal data’ (“processing”) shall mean any operation or set of operations which is 
performed upon personal data, whether or not by automatic means such as collection, recording, organization, 
storage, adaptation or alteration, retrieval, consultation, use, disclosure by transmission, dissemination or 
otherwise making available, alignment or combination, blocking, erasure or destruction.   
Profiling could include some of activities alluded above including the collection, storage, adaptation, 
alteration and the retrieval of personal data. 
The contextualised approach (also termed as “context-orientated”) is aptly summarised by Simitis (1999) 
as follows: 
Sensitivity is no more perceived as an a priori given attribute. On the contrary, any personal datum can, 
depending on the purpose or the circumstances of the processing be sensitive. All data must consequently be 
assessed against the background of the context that determines their use. The specific interests of the controller 
as well as of the potential recipients of the data, the aims for which the data are collected, the conditions of the 
processing and its possible consequences for the persons are factors that, put together, allow both the range and 
effects of the processing to be discerned and thus to determine its degree of sensitivity.  An evaluation of the 
sensitivity requires hence more than a mere look at the data. 
 
In the context of the online environment, the current approach based on the actual definition of personal 
data is not satisfactory, because it simply adopts the line that the publication of personal information involving 
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political opinions, religious beliefs etc. falls within Art. 8(1). Leaving aside the exemptions under Art. 8(2), it 
neither questions why the processing is taking place nor considers the circumstances in which particular areas of 
processing be regarded as sensitive. For example, I raise a particular problem that has not been adequately 
addressed by the DPD. Would I be processing sensitive data simply by gathering information about an individual 
(with or without the data subject’s knowledge), which reveals data containing religious views etc.? Under Art. 
8(1) of the DPD, it would. However, in gathering the information, I form an opinion or an assumption that a 
person belongs to a specific religious group or holds a political opinion? To give a pertinent example, company X 
holds information about Y’s reading habits. On the basis of this information, company X decides to send details 
about books that match Y’s reading habits. What if Y’s interest in the particular genre of books is only 
incidental?  In other words, Y’s company had made an assumption that X was interested in these particular books 
without ascertaining directly what Y’s interests were. Unless Y verifies the information with X, then Y will 
continue to operate under this false “assumption”.  Is there some legitimacy in my argument or does it sound far-
fetched?  I raise these questions, because there are some companies that form a profile of an individual without 
verifying this information with the individual concerned (Bygrave, 2003). Indeed, Bygrave (2003) has 
extensively dealt with the subject of profiling in his book entitled Data protection law: approaching its rationale, 
logic and limits. To give a foretaste of this subject, he defines profiling as follows: 
The profiling process has two main components: (1) the process of inferring a profile (2) the process of 
treating persons/entities in light of this profile. 
I do not want to discuss profiling in any great detail because the paper is principally concerned with the 
current interpretation of Art. 8 on sensitive data. The point that the paper is leading to is that the current 
interpretation of “sensitive data” under the DPD should be reviewed or re-examined in the light of technological 
developments. Whether this would mean either adopting a purposive based or a contextualised approach towards 
sensitive data, it is a progressive step towards the right direction in evaluating/assessing the criterion for sensitive 
data in the online environment. 
If, however, we accept that sensitivity is determined according to its context and not simply based on an 
enumerative list under Art. 8(1), then the objectives to critically assess the criterion under Art. 8(1) in this paper 
will have been achieved. Indeed, Simitis (1999) held that 
…sensitivity is no more than a mere alarm device. It signals that the rules normally applicable to the 
processing of personal data may not secure adequate protection. Its primary consequence is therefore to incite a 
reflection process the purpose of which is to locate the shortcomings of the existing regulations and to establish 
the improvements needed. Both the starting point and the range of all considerations are determined by the 
potential contexts of the processing. They permit the specific risks to be discerned and the antidotes to be 
designed. Prohibition is hence a possible but by no means a compelling consequence. And even where it appears 
justified to forbid the use of certain data, the prohibition remains a reaction confined to the context that 
legitimates and at the same time limits the exclusion of the processing (emphasis added). 
Finally, I want to look at the arguments put forward by Simitis (1999) regarding the reduction of 
exceptions to sensitive data. Although the report was examining the subject in the context of the CoE 1981 it is, 
nevertheless, relevant for the purposes of the DPD.  Simitis argues for a reduction of the present lists of 
exceptions under the CoE to sensitive data.  For example, he considers the issue of consent to exempt the 
processing of sensitive data. 
Already the seemingly incontestable exception heading every list, the consent of the data subject, is 
anything but convincing. Consent is, contrary to still widespread views, not a master-key opening all doors to any 
data potential controllers are interested. Employment relationships are only one of many examples demonstrating 
that consent does not necessarily guarantee a participation of the data subjects enabling them to freely decide 
whether their data should be processed for purposes known and approved by them….Employment relationships 
underscore therefore the fallacies of the assumption that consent incorporates and secures the data subjects’ 
power to determine the use of their data. 
Moreover, if one considers the current DPD, the main criticism is that the exemptions under Art. 8(2) to 
the processing of sensitive data are so wide that it brings into question the effectiveness of Art. 8. As illustrated 
by Simitis (albeit in the context of the CoE Convention on Personal Data 1981), 
 
Terms like public interest or public security are de facto a carte blanche allowing all restrictions finally to 
be bypassed. The references to both are therefore usually followed by a statement specifying that the conditions 
of the access have to be regulated by law. 
Art. 8(4) DPD provides that  
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Subject to the provision of suitable safeguards, Member States may, for reasons of substantial 
public interest, lay down exemptions in addition to those laid down in paragraph 2 either by 
national law or by decision of the supervisory authority. 
 
Under Art. 8(4) DPD member states can extend the exemptions to sensitive data “for reasons of substantial 
public interest” subject to suitable safeguards. Whether member states have availed themselves of this provision 
is another matter. The point is that even though sensitive data is processed, it could be exempted under a broad 
range of headings (as provided under Art. 8(2)). 
Simitis (1999) pertinently states that  
Sensitivity is reduced to a merely ornamental function where the access can be broadened without any 
difficulties. Exceptions can certainly not be avoided. But as justified as they may appear, they are intolerable as 
long as their wording is not precise, their purposes and consequences not clearly determined, the data asked for 
not confined to really necessary information and the use limited to unmistakably defined controllers. 
Space does not permit me to examine all the arguments raised in Simitis’s report (1999), but the purpose 
of considering the issues above is to underscore the dissatisfaction that I have with the current approaches to the 
regulation of sensitive data under the DPD. In the following section, I want to make some recommendations 
about this 
 
5. Recommendations  
 
In the light of the arguments about the current approach to sensitive data and in particular, its application on the 
internet, the question is whether anything can be achieved to address the above issues? Uncertainties still remain 
on the issue of “profiling” and “identification numbers linking to databases” and whether these activities would 
fall within Art. 8 of the DPD.  Certainly, it can contended that if the act of profiling leads to personal data 
revealing racial origin, political opinions or religious or philosophical beliefs, trade union membership, and the 
processing of data concerning health or sex life then Art. 8 applies. However, what is required is more discussion 
by data protection authorities and interested parties about “sensitive data” under Art. 8(1) DPD and whether the 
list could (if at all possible) be amended to take account of technological developments. 
Secondly, data protection authorities, legislators and other interested parties should reconsider the 
approaches towards sensitive data (whether contextualised or purpose-based) particularly in the light of 
Lindqvist.  
Thirdly, there is the subject of enforcement particularly against countries outside the EEA. How do we 
deal with the case where a data subject within the European Community finds his/her sensitive data being used 
without his/her knowledge outside the EEA? In other words, are the current mechanisms of co-operation 
between supervisory authorities adequate or can it be improved? Moreover, there are some countries that do not 
have data protection laws, but handle personal data (whether sensitive or not) belonging to data subjects within 
the European Community. Art. 25 of the DPD (on transborder data flows) prohibits the transfer of personal data 
to countries outside the EEA (termed “third countries”) unless the country in question satisfies the adequacy 
requirement laid down under Art. 25(2) DPD. It does not deal with the collection of personal data by individuals 
or legal entities outside the EEA that was not directly obtained from  the data subjects? For example, X (from a 
“third country”) surfs the internet and finds information about Y, which he subsequently posts an article on the 
internet including the fact that Y belonged to a religious group. Clearly this is processing of sensitive data. 
Leaving aside defamation laws, if X’s country does not have data protection or privacy laws, then prima facie, it 
would be difficult to see how Y could seek to enforce his rights. What is recommended is further discussion/co-
operation between the EU (acting on behalf of member states) and countries outside the EEA in dealing with the 
issue of personal information on the internet. 
 
To summarise, 
 
1) Further clarification is needed either from data protection authorities or Art. 29 Working Party 
about profiling and national identification numbers. 
2) Review of the stances towards sensitive data under Art. 8 and its application on the internet by 
considering the purpose-based/contextualised approach.  
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3) Further discussion/co-operation between the EU and third countries to personal information on 
the internet. 
 
6.  CONCLUSION 
 
Throughout this paper, I have examined the category for sensitive data under Art. 8(1) taking into 
account the different approaches to the interpretation of sensitive data. The case of Lindqvist,7 
however, raises particular difficulties about the overall application of Art. 8(1) DPD to the internet and 
questions whether it is time to reform this provision. If we are to instil public confidence in the data 
protection framework through the DPD, then we (whether as data protection authorities, legislators etc) 
should ensure that only perpetrators are held accountable. We should refrain from adopting a blanket 
approach to the application of Art. 8(1) whereby anyone (subject to exemptions) who publishes 
personal data on the internet could be prosecuted. It is time to sit up and take notice. As the saying 
goes, “When you make a mistake, don't look back at it long. Take the reason of the thing into your 
mind and then look forward. Mistakes are lessons of wisdom. The past cannot be changed. The future 
is yet in your power.” (White). 
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